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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GIBBONS AND REED COMPANY, a ) 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) Case No. 14030 
-vs- ) 
CITY OF OGDEN, UTAH, a munici- ) 
pal corporation; UTAH STATE ROAD 
COMMISSION; OSCAR A. ROBIN; and 
HARDY SCALES CO., a corporation, ) . 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
DEFENDANT, UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This respondent agrees with appellant's statement set 
forth in its brief. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court entered judgment in favor of all defend-
ants and respondents, no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant and respondent, Utah State Road Commission seeks 
an affirmance of the trial court's determination that said re-
spondent is not liable to appellant and that its option agree-
ment with Ogden City was valid and binding and entitled appel-
lant to remove a "reasonable" amount of material and that re-
spondent, Utah State Road Commission, did not act improperly 
in obtaining the option agreement from Ogden City. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent, Utah State Road Commission, essentially 
accepts the statement of facts submitted by appellant as 
being a correct statement. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE OPTION AGREEMENT WAS VALID AND WAS ENFORCEABLE BY 
GIBBONS AND REED COMPANY. 
This respondent believes and, therefore, alleges that •] 
the argument of appellant in its brief concerning this point 
is a correct summary and conclusion of the law in this area 
and urges that the court accept the arguments of appellant 
regarding the validity of the option obtained by respondent, 
Utah State Road Commission, from the respondent, Ogden City. 
By way of observation, respondent would point out that 
the only thing possibly lacking in its option agreement neces-
sary to constitute a binding contract under any theory is the 
amount of material to be removed. Since, in any agreement of 
this nature the amount to be removed is contingent on many 
factors, including its suitability, location to the project, 
future use of the property, the owners desires, etc., and 
since either of the parties to the option agreement could be 
adversely affected by the insertion of a definite amount of 
material, it is submitted that the option should be considered 
as binding, at least for the removal of a "reasonable amount." 
The cost to either party or both if a complete investigation of 
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the material source is made in order to define an exact fig-
ure to be inserted in an option agreement of this nature could 
be an undue burden on the cost of doing business* 
As to the argument that the term "reasonable amount" is 
indefinite, the facts in the instant case would seem to illus-
trate the point that it may not be too difficult to determine 
what is a "reasonable amount." For instance, the State and 
Ogden City obviously had in mind six-feet to eight-feet and 
possibly up to 12-feet of depth, depending on which testimony 
is considered significant. Six-feet to eight-feet is the a-
mount Kelly represents (R-596). Six-feet is significant in 
relation to the existing option with Marquardt when the State 
obtained its materials option. Obviously, the landowner is 
not going to ruin the potential of the land. The fact they 
were excavating up to 12-feet leads one to conclude that this 
amount would not affect the lands potential. Appellant's pro-
jections on the other hand, (up to 30-feet) would appear to 
exceed the parameter of a "reasonable amount" since it would 
presumably reduce the "after value" of the land. Therefore, 
one can assume that when the State and Ogden City negotiated 
the option agreement "reasonable amount" meant something be-
tween six-feet and 12-feet of average depth. Mr. Griffin's 
estimate (Dfs Ex.No. 1) based on six-feet is 198,000 yards, 
simple arithmetic makes it 396,000 yards at 12-feet of depth. 
It is submitted that the court's refusal to find a binding 
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agreement against the defendant, Ogden City, for the alleged 
reason that the option is not valid is unreasonable and works 
an injustice on appellant and respondent, Utah State Road Com-
mission. 
In any event, Ogden City's reasons for repudiating the 
contract were not based on the assertion that the option agree-
ment was void, but were based either on the idea that they had 
some hidden agreement with the Road Commission that they did 
I 
not have to honor the option or that they could restrict the !. 
amount of material to be removed to such a small amount that 
the practical effect was tantamount to no agreement. 
Respondent, Road Commission, alleges that there was no 
reservation express or implied that Ogden City would not have 
to honor the agreement, nor does the agreement give Ogden City 
the right to limit removal to such a degree that nothing could 
be removed. It is, however, asserted that a "reasonable amount" 
was available for removal and this "reasonable amount" would 
be between 198,000 cubic yards and 396,000 cubic yards and that 
Ogden City well knew this and recognized its obligation as is 
clear in the sale agreement to Robin. 
Respondent, Road Commission, alleges that the court should 
give meaning to the option agreement if at all possible and 
alleges this can be done by finding that the parties to the 
option agreement (S.R.C. & Ogden City) both understood "reason-
able amount" to be something between 198,000 and 396,000 cubic 
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yards and that to refine the amount to a precise figure is 
unnecessary and, in fact, would be burdensome* 
II 
OGDEN CITY IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT THE OPTION 
AGREEMENT WAS TOO VAGUE. 
Respondent, State Road Commission, accepts and agrees 
with appellants assertion regarding estoppel and its applica-
tion to Ogden City in this matter. I 
As pointed out under Point I, Ogden City considered itself j. 
bound to appellant and respondent, State Road Commission, as 
is obvious in the sale agreement with Robin and/or Hardy Scales. 
Its refusal to permit removal is a wrongful act and Ogden City 
should be estopped since its agents well knew that appellant 
was relying on the option when it made its bid. If the op-
tion agreement was indeed defective, the defect was, in effect,l 
cured when appellant's representative consulted with Ogden's 
representative, Kimball, clothed with apparent authority, and 
determined an amount of material subject to removal. 
This, then, completed the last requirement necessary to 
effect a binding agreement, to wit, a definite amount. Kimball 
may not have had sufficient authority to bind the city had he 
executed the agreement, but his determination of an available 
amount should be within his authority and thus binding, or at 
least sufficient to raise an estoppel against the city now 
repudiating the agreement. 
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Ill 
OGDEN CITY BREACHED THE OPTION AGREEMENT. 
The respondent, Utah State Road Commission, does not agree 
with the trial court's conclusion that there was no breach of 
the option agreement. 
Respondent, Road Commission, agrees with the argument of 
appellant as set forth in appellant's brief on this point. 
It should also be pointed out that Ogden City's actions 
prior to the sale to Robin and/or Hardy and as evidenced in i 
that agreement of sale reveal that they considered the option 
agreement to be a binding agreement. For instance, they in-
form appellant that they will not allow removal of material, 
they reiterate this in the Weber Club meeting, (R-633, 634) 
at which time they were concerned enough about their actions 
to promise they would find other material, and three days 
later in the sale to Robin, they recognize the rights of the 
State and seek to protect themselves. (R-371) 
Respondent, Road Commission, submits that at the time of 
the meeting in the Weber Club, it could not have been any more 
clear to the City of Ogden and its responsible governing body 
(City Commission) that the option agreement would be exercised, 
but for their refusal to honor the appellant's request as well 
as the respondent, Road Commission, both of whom were in effect 
saying, "We want the material, we'll exercise the option." 
The City, on the other hand in effect is saying, "We wonrt 
honor the option, but we recognize our responsibility and will 
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get you other material." To say the option must be exercised 
in writing to preserve the rights of the State and its contrac-
tor in this situation is to say the least, ridiculous. What 
additional notice could a writing communicate? Indeed, what 
good would a written notice be and what purpose would it serve? 
The real question is, how do you exercise an option? The 
answer is, you communicate notice of intent to the party who 
gave the option and meet the requirements set forth in the 
option. Appellant obviously gave the notice, if not to Kimball 
(lack of authority?) certainly to the City Commission, City 
Manager and all the world before and during the Weber Club 
meeting. The appellant and respondent, Road Commission, were 
obviously prepared to meet the option terms and conditions. 
It is clear that the option was "exercised" contrary to 
the trial court's conclusion at some point prior to or at 
least in the Weber Club meeting, and Ogden City could have 
complied with the option or caused Robin and/or Hardy Scales 
to comply at any time presumably. 
Ogden City obviously breached the option agreement. 
IV 
THE OPTION AGREEMENT WAS ENFORCEABLE AND CONTAINED NO 
RESTRICTIONS ON REMOVAL OF MATERIAL BUT THIS WOULD BE DETER-
MINED BY WHAT WAS REASONABLE. 
Appellant argues in its brief that respondent, Road Com-
mission, may be liable to appellant for failure to disclose 
limiting conditions imposed by Ogden City upon removal of 
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material or for positive misrepresentations as to the source 
of materials. 
Respondent, Road Commission, disputes the conclusions of 
appellant and denies that the evidence shows what appellant 
erroneously asserts concerning removal of material. 
The option agreement contains no indication of the amount 
of material available or any maximum or minimum depth of re-
moval. The language says removal will be to the "owners lines 
and grades." The person who seeks to exercise the option has 
the burden of determining what, in fact, is available and what 
conditions are. (See language quoted in appellant's brief from 
Ex. M.[StandardSpecificationsj on Pages 7 and 8 requiring notice 
of intent to owner of material.) Appellant contacted a repre-
sentative of the City, Ray Kimball, and based upon that contact 
reached certain conclusions regarding availability of material. 
If Mr. Kimball did not have the authority to bind Ogden City 
by his statements, the respondent, Road Commission, is legally 
and contractually not responsible to appellant for any erroneous 
information or representations when appellant fails to notify 
the right individuals or representatives of Ogden City. In-
cidentally, respondent, Road Commission, believes and asserts 
that the said Kimball had at least apparent authority to bind 
Ogden City, and certainly the City was on notice of appellant's 
intentions after the conversation with Kimball and their con-
tinued silence and failure to notify appellant that material 
would either not be available or at least not to the extent 
of their expectations as communicated to Kimball should either 
-R-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
bind them by their silence or estop them from now asserting 
that material was not available. 
In any event, the written option contains no language 
which has the effect of a limitation on removal, but anyone 
seeking to exercise the option is in effect directed to Ogden 
City to determine what, in fact, is available. How can re-
spondent, Road Commission, incur liability for alleged de-
ficiencies in the amount of material available without a 
representation? How can it be liable if it is determined 
that notice was defective? In either event, appellant was 
in effect directed to Ogden City and if indeed its contact 
with Ogden City was not sufficient to bind the respondent 
Ogden City, it is the sole responsibility of appellant. 
Notwithstanding the lack of language which would limit 
removal, was there, in fact, a limitation of this nature? 
The evidence would indicate that there was a discussion of 
an average removal depth of six-feet. Griffin stated, " . . . 
the notes that I took at that meeting he stated that an aver-
age depth of six-feet. They did not want to go below six-
feet." (R.557) He further explains possible reasons for 
this limitation and other language in the option in response 
to Mr. Roe's question by stating, "As Mr. Kelly explained, 
that there was this option to purchase with the Marquardt 
Corporation, between the Marquardt Corporation and Ogden 
City, and they did not want to obligate the City to removing 
this material from the entire piece of property if the Mar-
quardt Corporation decided to exercise their option to pur-
-9-
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chase, as he explained it to us." (R-561). Counsel for the 
Road Commission called Griffin back later in the trial to ex-
plain in what context the six-foot limitation was discussed 
and this explanation followed: "We were informed that al-
though Marquardt Corporation had the option with the City un-
til approximately the 1st of April, 1966, material could be 
removed from this property, and the average six-feet in depth 
was discussed in relation to this present agreement between i 
Marquardt and the City of Ogden that we could remove this much 
material, 
QUESTION: Even if Marquardt exercised the option? 
ANSWER: This was our understanding, yes. 
QUESTION: All right, now was anything else said about 
going any deeper than that? 
ANSWER: It was not stated specifically, but we were left 
with the impression that if Marquardt did not exercise the op-
tion that we possibly could obtain more material, but it would 
depend on the circumstances at the time. (R-737, 738). 
The Marquardt option expired a few months after the subject 
option was signed and several months before the contract was 
advertised for bid. The City excavation for garbage fill was 
to a depth of 12-feet. These facts are significant when com-
pared with Griffin1s statements as well as those of Kelly. 
The conclusions one gets from all the facts and statements 
is that: (1) Ogden City had property with available fill ma-
terial. (2) The property was under option, to Marquardt, but 
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it was apparent the sale would not be made to Marquardt. (R-
600, 601)• (3) That there was at least six-feet of average 
depth of fill material available. (4) That no exact determina-
tion of the removal depth was made by the City or the State 
Road Commission. (5) That both Ogden City and the State Road 
Commission expected the successful contractor would defer to 
a later determination by the City as to removal depth. ("Owners 
lines and grades"). (6) That regardless of the removal depth j 
i 
finally decided upon, the property was strategically located I 
and its ultimate use would be considered and would be the ma-
jor factor in determining removal depths, etc. (7) That ap-
pellant based its projections as to available material on in-
formation obtained from the Assistant City Engineer and not 
on information contained in the option agreement. (8) That 
whether six-feet, 12-feet or some other depth is selected as 
the removal depth will vary depending on whose opinion is sol-
icited as to a proper depth, and the projected future use of 
the property. (9) That nothing in the written option states 
that the State Road Commission agreed in any way that Ogden 
City would not have to honor the option agreement. 
When all the foregoing facts and conclusions are viewed 
objectively, it is submitted that one must conclude the option 
agreement was binding on the City and obligated the City to 
supply a "reasonable amount" of material and that this would 
not have been less than 198,000 cubic yards (six-foot average 
depth). 
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It is further submitted that the weight of the evidence 
does not indicate any limitation on removal except what would 
be reasonable considering the expected future use of the prop-
erty and that appellant must ascertain that fact from the 
proper representatives of the owner. The question of whether 
they were justified in relying on the Assistant City Engineer's 
representations or could assume that he would at least inform 
the proper city officials is the real question, not an alleged 
verbal reservation to the option by the city prior to execut-
ing the option agreement which would obviously be merged in 
the written option as any first year law student knows. 
As to the question of a positive misrepresentation by the 
fact the plans show a total quantity available in "prospect 
No. 1 which includes the property of Ogden City and the rail-
road, the contractor well knows, that, "The quantities appear-
ing in the prepared bid schedule are approximate only and are 
prepared for the comparison of bids. . . . and it is under-
stood that the scheduled quantities of work to be done and 
materials to be furnished may each be increased, diminished, 
or omitted as hereinafter provided without in any way invali-
dating the unit prices bid." (Ex. M. Sec. 1-2.4) While gen-
erally they are reasonably accurate a reasonable deviation in 
actual quantities as compared to estimated quantities could 
deviate plus or minus ten percent. This same rationale ap-
plies to estimates of quantities available in materials sites. 
The deviation in this instance, assuming removal of twelve-
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feet and all other factors being equal would be approximately 
ten percent less than projected. It is submitted that devia-
tions are common and, in fact, are expected in the normal 
course of the construction business. Respondent, Road Commis-
sion, therefore, submits that there is no factual basis for 
appellant's allegation concerning misrepresentation of avail-
able quantities of fill material. 
V ' ' .. ' | 
' • ! 
DEFENDANTS ROBIN AND HARDY SCALES TORTIOUSLY INTER-
FERRED WITH THE OPTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN GIBBONS AND REED 
COMPANY AND OGDEN CITY. 
Respondent, Utah State Road Commission, is pursuaded by 
the argument of appellant with regard to this point and, there-
fore, asks that the court find against the respondents, Robin 
and/or Hardy Scales Company. 
VI 
DAMAGES, IF ANY, SUFFERED BY GIBBONS AND REED WERE THE 
RESULT OF THEIR OWN ACTIONS OR OF THE RESPONDENTS, OGDEN CITY; 
ROBIN- AND/OR HARDY SCALES COMPANY AND ARE NOT CHARGEABLE TO 
THE STATE. 
It has already been pointed out in this brief that re-
spondent, Road Commission, contrary to the ruling of the trial 
court, believes the option it obtained from Ogden City to be 
a valid option agreement. Assuming that the option agreement 
was valid and binding, it then follows that it must be exer-
cised properly. If it was not properly exercised, that is the 
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fault of the contractor for not contacting the proper repre-
sentative of the respondent, City, or in some fashion failing 
to properly notify the City of its intent. Since an option 
is a continuing offer, it is hard to understand why there would 
not have been adequate notice to the City at some stage of the 
proceedings. If not in the conversation with the Assistant 
City Engineer (Kimball), certainly in the meeting with the 
City Council at the Weber Club. I 
There is the additional point raised by appellant regarding 
repudiation of the option agreement being an excuse for fail-
ing to exercise the option. 
In any event, the option agreement should have been con-
strued as binding. The State's responsibility or liability 
should terminate once it is construed as a binding option, 
except for the responsibility to protect the optionor as to 
payment for material removed and other internal features in 
the agreement itself. Once the contractor informs the City 
that it will exercise the option or the City informs the con-
tractor it will not honor the option, the respondent, Road 
Commission, should be relieved of any further responsibility, 
except as noted. The agreement or non-agreement becomes a 
matter between the appellant and the respondent, City. 
The appellant has attempted to raise the specter of a 
hidden reservation in the option agreement whereby the City 
would not have to honor the option unless it wanted to. This 
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is preposterous legally, and even more riduculous from a prac-
tical standpoint. The respondent, Road Commission, is concerned 
about providing material that is suitable and conveniently lo-
cated at the best price possible, in order to minimize construc-
tion costs. 
Exhibits E & F which are in evidence constitute an exchange 
of letters between the respondents, Road Commission and Ogden 
City relative to the availability of material from the city
 ; 
• i 
owned property. The only reservation is the statement by ' 
the City that, lf. . . we will work closely with you for the 
removal of the material," and " . . . the property is under 
option until next April." 
The facts developed at trial, it is submitted show the 
following by way of summary: 
1. The State Road Commission and Ogden City saw a mutual 
benefit in removing material from the City property for use as 
highway fill. 
2. The amount of material was not specified, but at least 
six-feet of average depth of removal was discussed. 
3. The property was under an existing option which expired 
well before any attempt was made to exercise this option. 
4. The property was sold by the City to respondent, Robin 
and/or Hardy Scales Company, and the buyer knew of appellant's 
intended exercise of the option. 
5. A decision was reached by the respondents, Ogden City 
• • • ' » • 
• • . . • • • • ! 
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and/or Robin (Hardy Scales) to refuse to honor the option agree-
ment. 
6. Ogden City considered the option to be binding as evi-
denced by its actions in referring to the "rights of the State 
Road Commission" in its sale agreement to Robin, and in the 
actions of the City Commissioners in the Weber Club meeting (R 
633) • 
7. The only involvement by the respondent/ Road Commission, 
after it obtained the option in any proceedings was as an ad- I 
vocate in behalf of appellant at the Weber Club meeting. 
8. Ogden City and/or Robin intentionally refused to honor 
the option agreement with full knowledge of appellants intended 
exercise of the option as is obvious from the fact the sale of 
the property from Ogden City to Robin occurred three days after 
representatives of appellant, and the respondents, Road Commis-
sion and Ogden City met and discussed the sale and its impli-
dations to the appellant. 
Respondent, Road Commission, believes the foregoing facts 
make it abundantly clear that the damages, if any, sustained 
by appellant were not caused or contributed to by the respon-
dent, Road Commission, but resulted from conscious decisions 
by Ogden City and Robin (Hardy Scales) to refuse to honor the 
option agreement which they obviously considered to be binding. 
It is equally clear that if it is concluded in some way that 
the option agreement was not properly exercised, then appellant 
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is chargeable with the failure to do so pursuant to the option 
agreement language as well as the Standard Specifications. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent, State Road Commission, obtained an option 
from respondent, Ogden City, which was a valid option. Even tak-
ing a narrow view and viewing the option as incomplete because 
it failed to define the amount of material to be removed, the 
evidence shows that this defect was "cured" when appellant in I 
consultation with a representative of respondent, Ogden City, ! 
determined what amount was available. The evidence further re-
veals that the respondents, Ogden City and Robin (Hardy Scales) 
acted both in verbal responses and in their written agreement 
as if they recognized a valid agreement existed to remove ma-
terial from the property. 
The respondent, State Road Commission, made no representa-
tions as to the amount of fill material available from Ogden City 
and appellant's allegation concerning a secret reservation or ver-
bal agreement with respondent, Ogden City, that it would not have 
to honor the agreement with the Road Commission is not supported 
by the evidence. A fair interpretation of the evidence shows 
respondent, Road Commission, expected that its contractor could 
remove material from the Ogden City Property, that it would at 
least exceed six-feet average depth, and reasonable assumptions 
based on respondent city's use of the property indicated a re-
moval depth of up to 12-feet. Evidence at trial clearly indicates 
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that if appellant was misled as to the amount of, or avail-
ability of material from Ogden City it was not the fault of 
respondent, Road Commission, but is, in fact, the negligence 
of appellant in failing to properly exercise the option or 
if the option was properly exercised, it is then Ogden City 
and/or Robin (Hardy Scales) which should respond because of 
their acts. 
In any event, if appellant failed to properly exercise 
the option, it is in no way the fault of respondent, Road j 
Commission. In fact, respondent, Road Commission, cannot be 
liable to appellant absent a showing that the option was not 
valid which it is respectfully submitted the evidence does not 
disclose, and further, it is submitted that legally the option 
was valid and binding under the best reasoned cases. 
Respondent, Road Commission, urges that the court make 
additional findings of fact and conclusions of law to the ef-
fect that the option agreement was a valid agreement and that 
appellant either failed to properly exercise the option or that 
respondents, Ogden City or Hardy Scales, or both are liable for 
damages, but that in any event, respondent, Road Commission is 
not liable. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LELAND D. FORD 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent, Road 
Commission 
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